



**BRITISH ACADEMY  
OF MANAGEMENT**

---

**BAM**  
CONFERENCE

---

**3RD-5TH SEPTEMBER**

**ASTON UNIVERSITY BIRMINGHAM UNITED KINGDOM**

This paper is from the BAM2019 Conference Proceedings

**About BAM**

The British Academy of Management (BAM) is the leading authority on the academic field of management in the UK, supporting and representing the community of scholars and engaging with international peers.

<http://www.bam.ac.uk/>

**Title:** Building and Sustaining London Transport's Corporate Strategy in a Time of Uncertainty 1963-87.

**Author and Affiliation:** Dr James Fowler, The Essex Business School, The University of Essex, Wivenhoe, Colchester, C04 3SQ.

**Email Address:** james.fowler@essex.ac.uk

## **Building and Sustaining London Transport's Corporate Strategy in a Time of Uncertainty 1963-87**

This article critically analyses London Transport's corporate strategy 1963-1987, from regaining independence as a quasi-public organisation in the early 1960s to the return of privatised transport in the 1980s. As the result of huge modal shift in transport use from the 1950s onwards, a quarter of a century of financial failure resulted in a lengthy and turbulent period of clashes between the organisation, the public, the Greater London Council and central government over strategy and governance. These cumulated in top level sackings, resignations and the 'Fares Fair' controversy between 1980-82. To identify and assess the strategies employed, a wide range of contemporary literature and archival sources from the period are used to develop and challenge theory on corporate competitive strategy and hybrid organisations. The article concludes by drawing lessons for theory and for today's Transport for London.

**Word Count:** 7140

## Introduction and Contribution

This paper critically examines London transport's corporate strategy vis a vis the demands of central government, municipal government and wider society through a 24-year period 1963-87. It was not a happy period. The organisation was continually criticised by its users, operators and political masters (Garbutt, 1985; Wolmar, 2002; 2005). The cause and the symptoms of the problem were not hard to find. Between 1953 and 1963 the number of cars entering central London daily rose by 121% from ca.30 000 to 66 200. (LT146/30). Two years later in 1965 the London Transport Board reported an annual loss for the first time ever (LT146/32).

During the following three decades of decline London transport was run under several different schemes of public administration referred to here as The London Transport Board (LTB), The London Transport Executive (LTE) and London Regional Transport (LRT). The LTB was a semi-autonomous public monopoly reporting directly to a minister (1963-69), the LTE was a semi-autonomous public monopoly reporting to a municipal body (1970-1983) and LRT was a semi autonomous public body reporting to a minister, but no longer running a monopoly as an increasing proportion of its services were contracted out to private providers (1984-1987). The primary focus of this paper is London transport's time as a municipal monopoly (1970-83). In this period the organisation was especially heavily criticised for politicisation (Cutler, 1982; Chapman, 1982) but the central charge was the absence of strategy or 'strategic drift' as theorised by (Scholes et al. 2009). This paper evaluates both charges with reference to both what occurred previously and subsequently.

In analysing the strategies of public transport providers a theoretical contrast may be drawn between the strategies of public sector providers seeking to maximise total utility and private providers counting on marginal utility (Mees, 2010). Picking apart the distinctions between private and public sector strategy is theoretically achievable (Johnson, 2001) but applying this to reality is problematic as the divisions between the public and private activities of organisations, especially large corporations, are inherently blurred (Ferlie et al. 2005). The sheer complexity of trying to achieve clarity of definitions lends itself to research into individual case studies from which insights from historical processes can contribute to literature on institutional theory (Decker et al. 2018). Case studies also allow for singular refinements and idiosyncrasies which produce a study more accurately depicting reality (Tennent, 2017) whilst simultaneously allowing new theories to built or existing theories be tested against reality (Bucheli, 2014).

Whilst historical case studies bring these benefits, there is also the ever-present danger of ahistoricism. In this case, many of the theories used to assess the actions of London transport could never have been applied because they were not published at the time. Furthermore, even where they were (Ansoff, 1965 and Penrose, 1959) I have found no archival record that they were consciously averred to. I should say at this point then that this paper's critique is very definitely retrospective. Intellectually, it is easy to apply hindsight and tidy history up under the appropriate contemporary theoretical headings whilst wagging a knowing finger at past figures who now seem to lack the necessary clarity of cerebral vision. Admittedly, this paper does some of that. However, this paper's other purpose is to tidy up current theory and practise up by applying the appropriate history and wag its finger at the present as well. Retrospection, when properly acknowledged, can fulfil at least two useful purposes.

Thus, a retrospective analysis of London transport as a historical case study allows this paper to make a number of contributions. Firstly by using London as an individual case we can construct a lengthy, detailed and continuous archival data sample. This combines both micro analysis at an organisational level and wider generalisability by virtue of its longevity and London's national and international significance which few other case studies of this type can

match (Haefeli et al, 2014 and Boone, 1995). Secondly, this data can be used to draw a number of parallels between the organisational predicaments and strategies 1963-87 and the current challenges faced by Transport for London. This can inform and impact on contemporary debate. Thirdly, the events of the period in question are poorly covered by existing historical literature and this paper considerably expands on the detail of what is known. Fourthly, by exploring a number of tensions within and between rival theories of organisational strategy and behaviour through the prism of recorded historical actions this paper can develop and challenge existing theory. We now turn to the latter two contributions through a discussion of the existing literature.

## Literature

The paucity and shortcomings of existing literature on the organisation and strategy of transport providers generally is commented on by Tennent (2017) who notes the tendency to cherry pick data coupled with a focus on a sequential, technical or passenger focused narrative at the cost of real organisational analysis. In the case of London in particular these same trends can be found in all the major transport histories (Jackson, 1962; Barker, 1974; Wolmar, 2002; Wolmar, 2005). Another important issue Barker's study is that it effectively stops in the 1960s. Regrettably Wolmar's subsequent books do not do a great deal to dispel the subsequent absence of detail. His 2002 book offers a balanced verdict over the origin and subsidiary factors of the strategic decline that afflicted London transport from the Second World War onwards, but it focuses primarily on the PFI deals of the late 1990s. Chapters two and three deal with the period addressed here, but their purpose is as an introduction to the main PFI related theme rather than discussing decline as the main narrative. Neither is the balance redressed in his more ambitious 2005 book, where remarkably just 30 pages out of 312 deal with the entire history of the Underground post 1945.

We are left with three other accounts of the period of a memoir type genre. As such, all of them are coloured to lesser or greater degree by the personal involvement of the authors in the events that they recount. Garbutt's<sup>1</sup> (1985) book covers the years 1965-84 in some detail. His central argument is that in order to succeed London transport above all needed stability. According to him this stability was denied to them by a merry go round of different politicians who had sacrificed the long term good of the organisation to contradictory political interests, especially during the years when it was controlled by the Greater London Council. There is a great deal of truth in this as we will see in the following findings sections, but it is both an incomplete picture of the wider external economic context and overly generous to London transport itself.

The flaw in Garbutt's argument is that he does not apply wider economic perspectives. We know that the UK as whole passed through a devaluation crisis in 1967, an inflationary crisis 1973-75 and a severe recession 1981-83. All of them caused considerable economic volatility. Politicians could potentially be blamed for the severity of those shocks, but completely evading them was never possible (Dell, 1997). By implicitly demanding continual macro-economic stability Garbutt was perhaps unconsciously harking back to the two decades of relative stability following the Second World War.

External pressures are inevitable and setting a strategy to deal with them is entirely commensurate with the purpose of senior management (Magretta, 2012; Clegg et al. 2017). In a similar vein, Garbutt's book simply accepts the modal shift in transport to the use of the car as inevitable. In the findings chapters we will see just how profound a modal shift this was between the early 1950s and early 1970s. This paper argues that was the foremost

---

<sup>1</sup> Chief Secretary to the London Transport Executive.

strategic challenge that London transport faced in the period. But, like London transport's annual reports, the fundamental change is noted by Garbutt without serious analytical extrapolations or strategic decisions being drawn from it.

The charge of passivity or strategic drift is hard to evade, but Garbutt largely eschews criticising London transport's senior management and keeps the politicians firmly in his sights. Thus, he has little to say about internally situated in resource-based views of organisational strategy as a critique of performance (Nonaka, 1995; Clegg et al. 2017). In summary, Garbutt's view is over situated within the conception of strategy as the product of external events as per Porter's diamond (Porter, 1980; 1990). While it is true that managing the external 'authorising environment' in which a public sector or hybrid organisation operates is a critical element of its strategy (Johnson, 2001) but it is not a sufficient explanation alone.

Two other contemporaries of Garbutt, Sir Horace Cutler<sup>2</sup> and Leslie Chapman,<sup>3</sup> have also published memoirs which include substantial sections on the operation of London transport in the 1970s. Cutler's (1982) and Chapman's (1982) diagnosis of the causes of organisational failure is essentially the same: waste, over-manning, and the absence of strategic direction. Unlike Garbutt their main target is the internal management which is characterised as complacent and possibly corrupt. Similarly they make no allowance for the macro-economic roller coaster which London transport had gone through in the previous decade, and like Garbutt, the expansion of car ownership is perceived with curiously passivity like the changing of the weather rather than as a phenomenon to be critically deconstructed. As a Conservative politician Cutler probably saw rising car ownership as something essentially desirable or at the very least as something that he did not want to stabilise or reduce. It would be interesting to speculate just how far this latter attitude penetrated into London Transport itself.

However, the central issue with both books is that they are highly politicised and lack perspective. They both appeared in 1982, a mere 12 months after Cutler had lost the 1981 Greater London Council (GLC) elections and Chapman had been sacked (by Cutler) in the same year. They offer fascinating first-hand accounts of the realities of strategy making, but recriminatory language abounds. Thus one of the contributions of this paper is to offer a systematic analysis of London transport's strategy situated more in theory rather than experience. To do this we now turn away from the personal and towards the abstract in the form of general theories of strategy.

We begin by noting that strategic management theory largely evolved in the private corporate sector (Johnson, 2001). Books on strategy often break up their narrative by offering case studies of organisations (Johnson et al. 2009; Magretta, 2012; Clegg et al. 2017) and these are overwhelmingly located in the private sector. Examples of hybrid organisations are often located as a genre within books or papers orientated towards public sector strategy (Kuoppakangas, 2013). As alluded to in the introduction, hybridity theoretically falls between the public and private stools, but in terms of analysing the realities of hybrid organisations the absence of profit and often of competition appears to have aligned them more with public or non-profit organisations in the minds of theorists. This paper challenges the validity of this choice.

Literature focussed on private sector strategy makes it clear that both the goal and the metric of strategy are monetary. Magretta's (2012) book on Porter has an entire chapter simply entitled 'Competing for Profits' and states that the correct measure to assess the success of strategy is the return on invested capital. Later in the book in an interview with Porter

---

<sup>2</sup> Leader of the Greater London Council 1977-81.

<sup>3</sup> Part time member of the London Transport Executive 1979-81.

Magretta claims that non-profits organisations ‘don’t spend much time on strategy’, an extraordinary statement only really defensible within an understanding of strategy as something primarily related to profits. In response Porter offers the observation that non-profits organisations find it hard to make the trade-offs essential to formulating strategy because they don’t have ‘clear value metrics to guide [them]’ which again assumes value to be synonymous with money. In summary, whilst Porter’s theories on the external forces acting on strategy formulation from outside the organisation are an important element in understanding what happened to London transport, his preoccupation with financial metrics and free-market hostility to the role of the state (Carter et al. 2008) must be taken into account when applying it to quasi-public organisations.

Alternatively, an organisation’s strategy may be better understood as the management of its internal resources which are either property or knowledge based (Clegg et al, 2017). In this case, what physical resources did London transport have that were valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable and how did it co-ordinate, communicate and control the knowledge it possessed? The resource based view of strategy is linked to Ansoff’s (1965) work which sees strategy as the product of a rational planning process by executive staff. This model has been shown to have ‘real world’ shortcomings related to the actual behaviours of managerial staff (Mintzberg, 1990). However, its use here lies in the insight into contemporary thought about strategy in the period which it provides. In summary, the advantage of the resource based set theories to the case study is that while they have their critics who see them as truistic (Kraijenbrink et al, 2010) or unrealistic (Mintzberg, 1990), they were regarded as cutting edge during much of the period considered and they are generally not as tightly located in the context of financial metrics and by implication a private sector orientated set of conceptions, purposes and formulations of strategy.

This brings us to public sector organisations. As we have seen, theory suggests that they can be distinguished from the private sector along the lines that they produce ‘public’ non-excludable goods, they are financed via taxation rather than direct payments by individuals, their assets are owned by the state and most importantly there is no direct link between ability to pay and access to the goods or service (Flynn, 2007). There are several implications of these factors for strategy setting. Firstly, Porter is correct in so far as he says that the metrics for judging the creation of public value are not necessarily as clear as those for private value. However, as we will see in the findings section it would be very unwise for a public sector manager to assume that they do not exist at all. Secondly, as a result of the wider scope of the definition of public value, public sector strategy should encompass a wider set of stakeholders, and have calls on a wider set of resources and productive capabilities (Johnson, 2001). Given the larger number of stakeholders and the greater concern for qualitative outcomes as well as qualitative outputs claimed by Johnson, it is unsurprising that the chief difference identified in the literature between public and private sector strategy is that the political management of the ‘authorising environment’ in which public sector organisations exist is a higher priority to them. In accounting terms the value of these strategies of political conditioning could be construed as a form of amortisation of assets. Just as in accounting though, the central problem is that these values are intangible expressions of confidence about the future viability of the organisation rather than actual assets and liabilities owned. Johnson (2001) argues that this intangibility poses particular problems for strategy formulation as based on the rational planning or hierarchical models articulated by Ansoff (1965). This paper’s findings bear out this analysis.

In conclusion London transport’s strategy 1963-87 is either not handled or slightly skated over by the panoramic histories. It has produced several first hand if politically coloured accounts from contemporaries, unfortunately with many of the inherent imbalances in argument and evidence that might be expected. This leaves strategy theories, themselves

somewhat biased towards a private sector view of organisational goals. By combining all the approaches outlined in the literature as a framework for retrospective analysis this case study offers a critique of London transport's strategic performance 1963-87.

### **The Strategy and Performance of the London Transport Board 1963-69**

The annual reports of London Transport Board were the summative formal mechanism by which the Board communicated with central government. To a lesser extent their audiences also included municipal government and the general public. They do not set out strategy per se, but the reader is presented with a clear mission statement from the London Transport Act 1962 - which is reproduced below - combined with pieces of strategy scattered throughout the document. The reports assume a high degree of tacit knowledge and have to be scrutinised carefully to find what exactly the Board intended to do in order to realise these aims (Nonaka, 1995). For example, it emerges later in the 1963 report (LT146/30) that though the Act required the Board to break even, the Board actually agreed to two further financial duties, firstly to run a surplus of not less than £4 million annually and secondly to meet the interest charges on its debt. Thus the actual financial task of the Board statement was considerably harder than it might first appear.

It should also be noted that the Board differed from its predecessor, the London Transport Executive (1948-62) in that it was no longer a component of the British Transport Commission, but answered directly to the Minister of Transport. In theory this change allowed the Board greater freedom to set strategy, albeit within parameters. To that end, we should briefly return to the purposes of the Board as outlined in the Transport Act 1962 (LT146/30):

- a. To provide or secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport for the London Passenger Transport Area, due regard being had to the efficiency, economy and safety of operation.
  
- b. To co-operate with the Railways Board to ensure that the services provided are properly co-ordinated with the railway services of the Railways Board in the London Passenger Transport Area; the Railways are placed under a similar obligation.
  
- c. To secure that their revenue is not less than sufficient to meet all charges properly chargeable to revenue, taking one year with another, including proper provision for the depreciation or renewal of assets and proper allocations to a general reserve.

These are all admirable strategic objectives for a public transport organisation in a general sense. Theoretically, they are an approximate fit with Ansoff's three-part formulation of what strategy should be as they do present some, though incomplete, rules for governing the organisation's relationship with external agencies. However, they lack sufficiently detailed yardsticks for assessing performance and say nothing about the Board's internal processes (Ansoff, 1965). From Porter's perspective these aims acknowledge competition and the need to at least break even, but they offer nothing about what the organisation should 'trade off' if one aim is found to be in conflict with another (Magretta, 2012). Taken as whole, these aims vindicate Scholes (2001) observation that public service organisations serve a wide variety of stakeholders, but they say nothing directly about influencing the authorising environment in which they operate.

Overall, the reader is not left much wiser about the specifics. To find these, reading a sequential series of annual reports makes the key decisions clearer by inference and the



enduring strategic dilemmas and policies of the organisation gradually come into focus (LT146/30-36 series). From this collation, we may infer the following about the Board's formulation and implementation of strategy: Firstly, the Board – probably unconsciously – followed Ansoff's prescription of information gathering for a small centralised group of senior 'rational' actors. Secondly, these actors identified three causally linked strategic problems. One, the Board was no longer able to financially break even after 1965. Two, this was primarily caused by the infrequency and unreliability of bus services which was deteriorating sharply. Three, this was due to a shortfall of road operating staff and an increase in car traffic which was both a symptom and a cause of decline (Tables One and Three). Sifting the main text of the reports reveals that the Board had one consistent major strategy and several conflicting minor strategies to deal with these interlinked issues.

The Board's biggest openly declared strategy was to pay staff more to increase recruitment and retention. In 1963 it appointed the Phelps-Brown committee which recommended a general pay rise with particular increases for road operating staff. Table Two shows that staff salaries rose consistently real terms. Unfortunately for the Board, Table One shows that it nevertheless failed to increase staffing, and Table Three shows the continued steady haemorrhage of passengers from public transport to cars.

The Board had several more minor declared strategies. These included lobbying for minor upward fare revisions and simplification, constructing more car parks, lobbying for road improvements to ease congestion and the gradual introduction of driver only operation on buses. None of these policies were particularly successful. Table One shows no significant rise in real investment in modernisation. The construction of car parks and road improvement were in conflict with the goal of reducing car usage. Driver only operation would take a while to fully implement and lacked funding commitment.

The most successful strategy was concealed until 1969. That year's annual report explicitly states that the senior members of the Board had been consistently privately lobbying the Minister of Transport to change the financial rules by which the organisation was governed. This follows Scholes' general observation that controlling the authorising environment is the key element of public sector strategy, which Stumm (1996) specifically shows can be highly effective in re-casting perceptions of financial yardsticks.

This strategy was highly successful. Very substantial changes were made in 1970 to the way in which London transport's financial position was calculated and governed including the write-off of its entire debt. As we will see these were very much to its immediate benefit. But from a 'Porterian' or private sector orientated perspective this strategy directly abrogates the primary purpose of strategy itself, which is to focus on making trade-offs to create value in the core business rather than to re-write the rules so that existing products or services become profitable again. Using Porter's five forces model what had happened was that a substitute product (the car) had destabilised the existing rivalry between competitors (Porter, 1980). Porter's prescription for dealing with this would have been a strategy based on maximising profits rather than competing for market share. Probable strategies would have withdrawn unremunerative services and created a fares system that was simplified in terms of geography but more highly differentiated in terms of time of travel. Both these strategies were attempted in a minor way (LT146/36), but the fundamental change to London transport's circumstances arose out of political rather than a commercial strategy.

In summary, I find that the period of the London Transport Board was the era when strategic drift solidified and manifested itself in a number of quantitative indicators. The change in car usage in the wider transport environment had been noted as early as the 1930s (Ashfield, 1933) but as Johnson (2009) notes there may be lagged performance effects which petrol rationing during the Second World War had considerably prolonged. Despite the lag, there was clear quantitative evidence from the mid 1950s that the number of private cars entering

central London was rapidly rising, and it continued to rise throughout the 1960s (Table Three). The financial effect followed in 1965 when London transport failed to generate a surplus for the first time ever. These figures were the undeniable harbingers of environmental change. The London Transport Board's only successful strategy in response was to politically lobby to re-frame the numbers. This indicates how wedded its qualitative decision making had become to building on the familiar, core rigidities and constricting relationships (Johnson, 2009).

### **Politics and The London Transport Executive 1970-83**

The London Transport Board became The London Transport Executive in 1970. As well as the name change, the organisation also moved from central government ministerial control to control by the Greater London Council. Politically, this is the era most charged with controversy (Chapman 1982, Cutler, 1982 and Garbutt 1985). Commentators (Wolmar 2005, Garbutt, 1985) have claimed that the state of politics in London was adversarial and out of kilter with national politics (Table Five), thus producing particular tension between City Hall and Westminster which adversely affected transport strategy, most notably sacking the Chairman Ralph Bennett in 1980, the 'Fares Fair' policy and the creation of London Regional Transport in 1984. This claim needs to be examined carefully.

Firstly, the pattern of election results shows that rather than an adversarial reaction to the results of national general elections, the results for GLC elections were in fact a fairly accurate prediction of what was going to happen at subsequent general elections with a time lag of about two to three years (Table Five). London pre-empted the wider UK political mood rather than angrily reacted to it. This does mean that the relationship between City Hall, the Executive and Parliament was always smooth, but I suggest that the Garbutt's and Wolmar's views are overly coloured by the particularly hostile events of last few years of the GLC 1980-85.

Secondly, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with democratically elected municipal politicians making strategic decisions about public services at odds with the national government. There is plenty of evidence from case studies that democratic accountability provides a useful handbrake to the actions of unaccountable elites (Morser, 2009, Basset 1984). Garbutt and others' objections are rooted in the organisational instability that they see as being caused by elections, but while this is undoubtedly a contributing factor Table Two shows that the trend towards decreasing periods of tenure by chairmen started well before the period of GLC control. Cutler and Chapman's accounts suggest that the increasing executive turnover was an accurate reflection of public and hence political impatience with the inability of successive chairmen to manage London transport in way that ensured it provided the services the public wanted.

Finally, Garbutt implies that the part time members of the Executive from 1981 onwards were political stooges from the GLC inexperienced in transport operations. There is clear evidence that in the years post 1981 politics began not just to dictate the broad parameters of strategy for the LTE, but also to make itself felt directly in proceedings in the Boardroom (LT128/118). Evidence from the archive on the voting record of the part-time members tends to vindicate Garbutt's view of their political purpose, though whether they were nevertheless pushing forward the right strategies and decisions remains a matter of political persuasion. What is certainly true is that party politics was directly intruding into not just strategy making but also day to day decision making in an overt and confrontational manner.

In summary, politics certainly played a larger and more direct role in the strategy of the LTE than its predecessor. However, for much its existence this was not especially controversial. Open political controversy and organisational instability began in the late 1970s when the

leader of the GLC sacked the LTE chairman and the subsequent leader of the GLC then began to pack the Executive with political affiliates. The pertinent question is not whether or not politicians got involved in the provision of public services at city level. Municipalisation and the devolution of power made this outcome inevitable. The issue is whether as Garbutt and others would have it that political interference resulted in increasingly poor organisational strategies, or whether as per Cutler, poor organisational strategies resulted in more political interference. To examine this we now turn to strategies and performance of the LTE.

### **The Strategies and Performance of The London Transport Executive 1970-77**

Like the LTB, the annual reports of the LTE were the summative mechanism by which the Executive communicated with the GLC, Parliament and the public. Changes in colour, format and the presentation of information suggest that the public and the media were being more actively touted. Black and white type face was reduced and glossy photos, colourful graphs and pie charts steadily increased (LT146/37-46 series). Although the word 'strategy' appeared for the first time in the 1970 edition, it was still not well articulated and readers would have had to carefully peruse the whole document, as although section six was entitled to 'Transport Planning' the text here was especially vacuous and only the most general of intentions were communicated (LT146/37). In fact, various pieces of strategy are scattered throughout the 1970 report, and this remains the case up until 1982 when dedicated corporate strategy section appears (LT146/49). The absence of a formalised framework through which strategy is presented does not necessarily mean that an organisation does not practise strategy (Mintzberg, 1990) but it does lend weight to the perception that the LTE was unable to turn any tacit knowledge it might have had about strategy into explicit knowledge with the resulting loss of efficiency (Takeuchi, 1995). To further support the argument that the LTE was little better than the LTB in the formulation of strategy, there are frequent references in the early 1970's reports to the eagerly awaited 'Greater London Development Plan' which would set out the GLC's vision for capital, including its transport strategy. This document was begun in 1969 and eventually approved in 1976. Even before it was published it was criticised for containing relatively little information, diffuse aims and vague policies by the Layfield Committee (Foster, 1973). In the meantime, the LTE appears to have been content to make strategy iteratively wait for this specific long term guidance.

From 1970 to 1973 the overriding financial aim of the LTE was produce no less than a £2 million surplus each year. It also aimed to increase ridership by holding down fares, and continued the LTB's policy of trying to hold down staffs costs and shortages by increasing driver only operation on buses. Its aim was to reduce road staff by 10 000 by the end of the decade. In pursuing these strategies it started with a considerable advantage over its predecessors because the entire £270 million debt of the LTB and its predecessors had been written off enabling a huge reduction in debt servicing (Table One).

The results from the 1970-73 period are mixed picture. Freezing fares halted but did not reverse the global decline in public transport journeys and reduced but did not halt the decline in the number of commuters entering central London by public transport (Table Three). The municipal and central government grants paid to London transport from 1965 (Table Four) made the concept of running an annual 'surplus' a purely constructed term, and this requirement was sensibly dropped in 1973. A more objective measure, the operating ratio, remained in deficit though stable until 1973 when it worsened considerably (Table Four). The staffing situation improved in some respects. Real wages rose steadily and road operating staff levels fell in line with the strategy of moving to driver only operated buses.

After 1973 the situation changed dramatically. In his memoirs, Cutler (1982) attributes this to the election of a Labour majority in the GLC. However, the quadrupling of the price of oil that year seems to be at least an equally important factor.

Once elected, one of Labour's key decisions in the wake of the oil crisis was to cancel the project to build two orbital ring roads in and around London (LT146/40). The LTEs strategic response to this sea change in the external environment seems muted or non-existent. The annual reports indicate that it was still expecting the long awaited Greater London Development Plan (GDLP). Its eventual arrival was noted in the 1976 annual report (LT146/43), but since it contained little of use in formulating strategy (Foster, 1973) the LTE confined itself to observing in its long term policies paragraph that public transport provision should be consistent with the GDLP guidelines, but that the LTE relied on consistency in local and national government policy making. The LTE had effectively abdicated formal strategy making, leaving strategy as being no more than the sum of day to day decisions taken by managers to keep the organisation going (Chapman, 1982). If trends in 'strategy as practice' can be discerned in this period, then in real terms investment declined (Table One) and fares rose for the remainder of the decade. The incremental policies of driver only operation on buses and curtailed additions to the tube network continued.

The result was that the decline in overall journeys by public transport resumed. Journeys in central London by commuters on public transport fluctuated considerably, but ended the decade at roughly the same level they had begun at. Car journeys grew slightly, though the frequent changes in calculation method by LTE make this hard to definitively establish (Table Three). The operating ratio worsened considerably, but then stabilised at a deficit of around £35million annually at constant 1963 prices. Equally, local and central government annual grants increased to around the same level (Table Four). As we have seen, the LTE had no openly declared strategy, and appeared content with managing the status quo.

In summary we can see that while there is no evidence that the LTE and the LTB deliberately thought in these terms, in retrospect they unconsciously followed the Ansoff (1965) model for strategy setting. The GDLP epitomised the concept of a comprehensive set of facts and figures considered by a group of senior experts and managers who then make the decisions. This failed. The process took too long, and decisions were not made.

This left London transport with choice of embarking on strategies based on competitive forces and positioning (Porter) and/or strategies based on controlling the authorising environment as per Scholes. In the 1960s a political strategy had proven the most effective, and the entire debt of the organisation was written off. But a successful political re-definition of the financial situation meant that problems with the core value that the organisation provided were largely avoided, tying into a narrative of strategic drift. Cutler (1982) identifies this issue, though he does not situate it in theoretical terms. A dramatic change in the external environment after 1973 meant that they rapidly returned, leading to period of flux and transformational change (Johnson 2009).

### **Crisis and Transformation at The London Transport Executive 1978-81**

In 1977 the Conservatives won the GLC elections and Horace Cutler became leader of the council. He removed Kenneth Robinson as chairman, allegedly because of his links previous Labour governments (Garbutt, 1985). He replaced him, though he was unconvinced by his performance, with Ralph Bennett who had been deputy to both the previous chairmen (Cutler, 1982). The appointment was seen by some as indicative of the concept of filling dead men's shoes over promoting talent that pervaded the LTE (Chapman, 1982). However, Cutler soon acted to shake up the organisation and remove, as he saw it, the financial albatross that was London transport from the necks of London's ratepayers (Cutler, 1982). He appointed

Leslie Chapman, a civil servant with reputation for exposing and cutting waste, to the Executive. His brief was to find out how much of the deficit was inevitable, how much stemmed from mismanagement and what could be done about it (Chapman, 1982). From here until the formation of LRT the management and policies of the LTE see sawed violently in a period of strategic flux.

In retrospect it is possible to assess why Cutler and Chapman failed. It is clear from his memoirs and other media sources that Chapman revelled in publicity, posing with an axe prior to his appointment and prioritising the publication of details of the luxurious dining facilities and chauffeured cars enjoyed by the managerial elite at LTE as part of his war on waste (Chapman, 1982). If he had conducted more extensive research his might also have discovered that the Chairman's salary had halved in real value in the past five years alone (Table Two), thus apparently giving the public much better value for money at the potential cost of losing talent. More importantly, he needed to investigate and address why the LTE and its predecessors were largely bereft of formalised strategy, detailed objectives or performance indicators focussing on the core value of its business. The row over dining facilities and expenses revealed him as a point scorer rather than a strategic reformer. The chairman Ralph Bennett was forced to resign and a caretaker chairman, Peter Masefield, replaced him. Chapman also resigned shortly afterwards and Cutler was defeated in the 1981 GLC elections. The critical points about the absence of strategy and lack of focus on productivity were made instead by the Deloitte report published in 1980 (Garbutt, 1985). In summary, the colourful events of the Cutler-Chapman period obscure important changes in the authorising environment. Cutler firmly believed that the LTE needed to look again at what did to see if it could do it better or possibly contract it out to cheaper alternatives (Cutler, 1982). There would be no more debt write offs. Chapman's actions pointed this out too, albeit in a very counter-productive way. Symbolically, in 1979 the bus service was divided out in eight different districts with the intention of pushing operational control and decision making as far down the organisation as possible (LT146/46). This was the start of re-examining the centralised structure of the LTE, and it had considerable effects in terms changing staff attitudes and incentives (Common et al, 1992). Thus by the early 1980s the stage was set for 'Porterian' conception of strategy based on the idea that the organisation should focus on conducting its core business better. Before this happened, there was one last attempt to radically re-imagine transport strategy as a mechanism to deliver a public good, challenging the direct link between ability to pay and access to the goods or service (London Industrial Strategy, 1985).

### **Fares Fair and the Strategy and Performance of London Regional Transport 1984-87**

In 1981 Labour won the GLC elections and Ken Livingstone became leader of the council. Far from concentrating on organisational efficiencies that might cost jobs, the direction of GLC policy was now framed by the idea that goods and services should be provided according to their usefulness and relation to social need (Rustin, 1986). In theoretical strategy terms, this meant concentrating on increasing market share. In practical terms the strategy manifested itself as 32% drop in fares in October 1981 which produced marked though short lived uptick in public transport use (Garbutt, 1985). This was successfully legally challenged and in March 1982 fares rose by 96%. This was followed by a 25% cut in May 1983. The effect of this strategic vacillation made 1982 the nadir of London transport's performance in terms of total passenger journeys, commuting, investment and subsidy (Tables One, Three and Four). The net effect of these extraordinary events was simply to hasten the removal of transport responsibilities from the GLC and speed the creation of London Regional Transport (LRT) which was directed controlled by central government. In terms of strategy this meant a

return to a reform of internal structures and thorough auditing of organisational activities on a cost benefit analysis rather than generating the maximum number of passenger miles within the resources granted by the GLC (LT146/ 49). 1982's annual report was the first to contain a formalised statement of corporate strategies. In brief, these ran as follows:

- a. Fares over longer distance to be reduced and the whole system simplified.
- b. Bus services to be tailored to local demand by local management. Little used tube stations to be closed.
- c. Unit costs to be reduced by at least 1% per annum over five years.
- d. Minor additions to the tube network at Heathrow and the construction of the Docklands light railway.
- e. Number of staff to be reduced.

There is some lack of clarity here about which of these are strategies and which are methods by strategies might be achieved. Furthermore, few of these strategies or methods would have come as a complete surprise to managers in previous decades. However, the mere fact of their codification, the delegation of control and eventual privatisation of some bus services and the quantification of efficiency targets were a marked departure from the way in which information and the organisation was managed in the 1970s. 1983's report hammered home the point. Here the report made explicit under a section entitled 'Corporate Objectives and Major Strategies' that all major decisions were to be made on the basis of Social Cost Benefit Analysis. What this meant in practice was that services provided should match demand, the organisation should concentrate on doing what it did more efficiently, and that annual reduction in unit costs should now be at least 2% (LT146/50). 1984 pushed this even further, looking for at least 2 ½% reductions annually (LT146/51) and in 1987 units costs fell by 4% (LT146/54).

We can see that the LRT met its goals and delivered some limited improvements. It was successful in reducing staff, though investment remained low but stable (Table One). Commuters into central London and on the whole system rose, and car journeys fell (Table Three). Receipts and the operating ratio improved slightly, and subsidy was reduced (Table Four). Whether all these goals were desirable is a matter of political perspective, but at any rate they represented the goals of LRT's strategy and as such they constitute success. More problematically for LRT's record is discerning what proportion of these changes was the result of internal strategy, or the product of a general economic upturn in the UK from 1983 onwards.

## **Conclusions**

The story of London transport 1963-87 offers a number of lessons for theory. Firstly that Ansoff's approach is rightly discredited. Even experts cannot digest the volume of detail needed quickly enough (Foster, 1973). The result for London transport was paralysis and organisational drift. Secondly, whilst hybrid organisations by their nature may need to pay more attention to the public political 'authorising environment' than private sector ones (Johnson, 2001) the experience of London transport indicates this may be dangerous if the time bought by political manoeuvre is not used to implement strategies more associated with the private sector concerning financial efficiency and reinvigorating core value. Several other

case studies suggest the same outcome (Bassett, 1984; Boone, 1995). This leads us to the observation that situating hybrid organisations primarily within a public sector theoretical discourse may be misplaced. Thirdly, private sector theory should not seek to differentiate itself on grounds of its ability to make trade-offs. What the London transport experience shows is the organisational problem lies with the debate over what metric is used to judge the trade offs. Once that has been decided then the strategies and trade-offs are clear for any organisation, public, private or hybrid.

For TfL, the events of 1963-87 offer two potentially awkward pieces of advice. Firstly, that a strategy of maximising market share via fare freezes leads inexorably to a rise in subsidy (Glaister, 1978). This in turn drags politics increasingly directly into strategy making. Secondly, that a strategy of scrutinising of unit costs appears to offer better service to customers than political management of the authorising environment, though the organisation itself will probably prefer the latter.

**Table One: The London Transport Board (LTB), London Transport Executive (LTE) and London Regional Transport (LRT) Investment and Road Staff 1963-87 (LT146/30-54 Annual Reports)**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Governing Body</b> | <b>Real Total Investment Including Depreciation and Renewal<br/>( Constant 1963 Million £)</b> | <b>Real Investment Excluding Depreciation and Renewal<br/>(Constant 1963 Million £)</b> | <b>Road Operating Staff</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------|--|---|-----------------------------|
| 1963        | LTB                   | 79   | 18  | 44904                       |
| 1964        | LTB                   | 83   | 20  | 45127                       |
| 1965        | LTB                   | 77   | 22  | 44988                       |
| 1966        | LTB                   | 78   | 19  | 45969                       |
| 1967        | LTB                   | 83   | 21  | 45817                       |
| 1968        | LTB                   | 69   | 26  | 42817                       |
| 1969        | LTB                   | 67   | 15  | 40615                       |
| 1970        | LTE                   | 25   | 14  | 23151 <sup>4</sup>          |
| 1971        | LTE                   | 31   | 16  | 22221                       |
| 1972        | LTE                   | 44   | 25  | 20534                       |
| 1973        | LTE                   | 47   | 24  | 19024                       |
| 1974        | LTE                   | 46   | 22  | 19394                       |
| 1975        | LTE                   | 32   | 20  | 20864                       |
| 1976        | LTE                   | 30   | 22  | 20847                       |
| 1977        | LTE                   | 25   | 16  | 20045                       |
| 1978        | LTE                   | 23   | 15  | 19961                       |
| 1979        | LTE                   | 32   | 20  | 19739                       |
| 1980        | LTE                   | 20   | 16  | 19850                       |
| 1981        | LTE                   | 21   | 17  | 19775                       |
| 1982        | LTE                   | 18   | 12  | 18990                       |
| 1983        | LTE                   | 21   | 13  | 18600                       |
| 1984        | LRT                   | 29   | 15  | 17100                       |
| 1985        | LRT                   | 26   | 15  | 15313                       |
| 1986        | LRT                   | 25   | 16  | 13401                       |
| 1987        | LRT                   | 25   | 13  | 13602                       |

<sup>4</sup> Drivers and Conductors only.

**Table Two: Salaries and Executive Experience 1963-87  
(LT146 Series)**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Chairman</b> | <b>Rolling Average Length of Chairman's Appointment</b> | <b>Chairman's Salary (Constant 1963 £s)</b> | <b>Average Staff Salary (Constant 1963 £s)</b> |
|-------------|-----------------|---|---|--|
| 1947        | Ashfield        | Served a total of 14 years.                             | 20 500                                      | -  |
| 1953        | Latham          | Served a total of 6 years.                              | -   | -  |
| 1953        | Elliot          | Served a total of 6 years.                              | -   | -  |
| 1963        | Valentine       | 1 (4) <sup>5</sup>                                      | 8 500                                       | 838  |
| 1964        | Valentine       | 2 (5)   | 10 000                                      | 848  |
| 1965        | Valentine       | 3 (6)   | 10 100                                      | 899  |
| 1966        | Holmes          | 1.5   | 9 700                                       | 897  |
| 1967        | Holmes          | 2   | 9 500                                       | 919  |
| 1968        | Holmes          | 2.5   | 9 000                                       | 940  |
| 1969        | Holmes          | 3   | 10 000                                      | 952  |
| 1970        | Way             | 2.3   | 10 900                                      | 964  |
| 1971        | Way             | 2.7   | 11 300                                      | 1017   |
| 1972        | Way             | 3   | 11 500                                      | 1050   |
| 1973        | Way             | 3.3   | 10 000                                      | 1101   |
| 1974        | Robinson        | 2.75  | 8 600                                       | 1204   |
| 1975        | Robinson        | 3   | 6 800                                       | 1350   |
| 1976        | Robinson        | 3.25  | 5 900                                       | 1227   |
| 1977        | Robinson        | 3.5   | 5 000                                       | 1069   |
| 1978        | Bennett         | 3   | 5 100                                       | 1066   |
| 1979        | Bennett         | 3.2   | 5 200                                       | 1258   |
| 1980        | Bennett         | 3.4   | 5 600                                       | 1245   |
| 1981        | Masefield       | 3   | 5 300                                       | 1238   |
| 1982        | Masefield       | 3.17  | 5 500                                       | 1279   |
| 1983        | Bright          | 2.85  | 5 500                                       | 1246   |
| 1984        | Bright          | 3   | 5 700                                       | 1119   |
| 1985        | Bright          | 3.15  | 6 200                                       | 1196   |
| 1986        | Bright          | 3.3   | 6 500                                       | 1189   |
| 1987        | Bright          | 3.45  | 6 700                                       | 1321   |

---

<sup>5</sup> Includes his time at the LTE.



**Table Three: Commuters Entering Central London Daily and Annual Usage 1963-87  
(LT 146 Series)**

| Date | Governing Body | Private Cars 0700-1000 Daily | Commuters Using Private Transport 0700-1000 Daily | Commuters Using London Transport 0700-1000 Daily | All Journeys on London Transport Annually (Billion) |
|------|----------------|------------------------------|---|--|---|
| 1952 | LTE            | 30 000                       | 69 000  | 268 400  | -   |
| 1963 | LTB            | 66 200                       | 120 400   | 214 900  | 3.1   |
| 1964 | LTB            | 68 100                       | 120 100   | 191 000  | 2.9   |
| 1965 | LTB            | 68 800                       | 116 800   | 179 700  | 2.8   |
| 1966 | LTB            | 70 500                       | 113 500   | 174 900  | 2.4   |
| 1967 | LTB            | 69 700                       | 111 800   | 172 200  | 2.3   |
| 1968 | LTB            | 73 500                       | 115 600   | 166 600  | 2.4   |
| 1969 | LTB            | 71 300                       | 109 100   | 156 700  | 2.3   |
| 1970 | LTE            | 88 100 <sup>6</sup>          | 134 000 <sup>7</sup>                              | 541 000 <sup>8</sup>                             | 2.2   |
| 1971 | LTE            | 88 700                       | 137 000   | 535 000  | 2.1   |
| 1972 | LTE            | 96 800                       | 138 000   | 531 000  | 2.1   |
| 1973 | LTE            | 89 800                       | 139 000   | 514 000  | 2.1   |
| 1974 | LTE            | 124 100 <sup>9</sup>         | 184 000 <sup>10</sup>                             | 517 000  | 2.1   |
| 1975 | LTE            | 118 000                      | 185 000   | 492 000  | 2.0   |
| 1976 | LTE            | 119 200                      | 187 000   | 476 000  | 2.0   |
| 1977 | LTE            | 124 000                      | 192 000   | 567 000  | 1.9   |
| 1978 | LTE            | 130 000                      | 185 000   | 568 000  | 1.9   |
| 1979 | LTE            | 128 400                      | 195 000   | 570 000  | 1.8   |
| 1980 | LTE            | 138 000                      | 211 000   | 538 000  | 1.7   |
| 1981 | LTE            | 131 000                      | 199 000   | 573 000  | 1.6   |
| 1982 | LTE            | 146 000                      | 235 000   | 504 000  | 1.5   |
| 1983 | LTE            | -                            | 193 000   | 545 000  | 1.7   |
| 1984 | LRT            | -                            | 206 000   | 578 000  | 1.8   |
| 1985 | LRT            | -                            | 212 000   | 605 000  | 1.9   |
| 1986 | LRT            | -                            | 187 000   | 637 000  | 1.9   |
| 1987 | LRT            | -                            | 181 000   | 668 000  | 2.1   |

<sup>6</sup> Includes adjustment to include all major roads.

<sup>7</sup> Includes adjustment to include all major roads.

<sup>8</sup> Includes Underground railways from this point.

<sup>9</sup> Includes adjustment to include all minor roads.

<sup>10</sup> Includes adjustment to include all minor roads.

**Table Four: Income, Grants and Surpluses/Deficits 1963-87 (LT 146 Series)**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Governing Body</b> | <b>All Traffic Plus Other Revenue<br/>£ Millions<br/>(Constant 1963 Prices)</b> | <b>All Municipal and Government Grants<br/>£ Millions<br/>(Constant 1963 Prices)</b> | <b>Traffic Receipts Minus Operating Costs<br/>£ Millions<br/>(Constant 1963 Prices)</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---|--|---|
| 1963        | LTB                   | 83  | 0  | 5   |
| 1964        | LTB                   | 85  | 0  | 1   |
| 1965        | LTB                   | 84  | 5  | -1  |
| 1966        | LTB                   | 81  | 9  | -2  |
| 1967        | LTB                   | 79  | 13   | -5  |
| 1968        | LTB                   | 78  | 14   | -4  |
| 1969        | LTB                   | 79  | 5  | -2  |
| 1970        | LTE                   | 85  | 9  | -2  |
| 1971        | LTE                   | 87  | 21   | -1  |
| 1972        | LTE                   | 93  | 27   | -7  |
| 1973        | LTE                   | 87  | 10   | -33   |
| 1974        | LTE                   | 72  | 20   | -27   |
| 1975        | LTE                   | 67  | 42   | -43   |
| 1976        | LTE                   | 74  | 34   | -36   |
| 1977        | LTE                   | 74  | 24   | -27   |
| 1978        | LTE                   | 77  | 22   | -24   |
| 1979        | LTE                   | 74  | 22   | -30   |
| 1980        | LTE                   | 76  | 25   | -25   |
| 1981        | LTE                   | 68  | 23   | -33   |
| 1982        | LTE                   | 71  | 34   | -33   |
| 1983        | LTE                   | 73  | 38   | -34   |
| 1984        | LRT                   | 70  | 35   | -45   |
| 1985        | LRT                   | 76  | 33   | -31   |
| 1986        | LRT                   | 77  | 32   | -31   |
| 1987        | LRT                   | 79  | 25   | -23   |

**Table Five: The National and London Political Landscape 1963-84**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Governing Body</b> | <b>Party in Power in London</b> | <b>Party in Power Nationally</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1963        | LTB                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1964        | LTB                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1965        | LTB                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1966        | LTB                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1967        | LTB                   | Conservative                    | Labour                           |
| 1968        | LTB                   | Conservative                    | Labour                           |
| 1969        | LTB                   | Conservative                    | Labour                           |
| 1970        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Conservative                     |
| 1971        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Conservative                     |
| 1972        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Conservative                     |
| 1973        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1974        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1975        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1976        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Labour                           |
| 1977        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Labour                           |
| 1978        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Labour                           |
| 1979        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Conservative                     |
| 1980        | LTE                   | Conservative                    | Conservative                     |
| 1981        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1982        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1983        | LTE                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1984        | LRT                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1985        | LRT                   | Labour                          | Conservative                     |
| 1986        | LRT                   | -                               | Conservative                     |
| 1987        | LRT                   | -                               | Conservative                     |

## **Biography of Works Cited**

### **Books**

Ansoff, I. (1965) *Corporate Strategy*, London:Penguin.

Barker, T & Robbins, M. (1974) *A History of London Transport Volume Two*, Allen & Unwin.

Bucheli, M & Wadhvani, R (2014) *Organisations in Time*, OUP.

Carter, C Clegg, S & Kornberger, M. (2008) *A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book About Studying Strategy*, London: Sage.

- Chapman, L. (1982) *Waste Away*, London:Chatto & Windus.
- Clegg, S Schweitzer, J Whittle, A & Pitelis, C. (2017) *Strategy, Theory and Practice*, London:Sage.
- Common, R Flynn, N & Mellon, E. (1992) *Managing Public Services*, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Cutler, H. (1982) *The Cutler Files*, London: Weidenfield & Nicholson.
- Dell, E. (1997) *The Chancellors*, London: Harper Collins.
- Ferlie, E. Lynn, L. & Pollitt, C. (2005) *The Oxford Handbook of Public Management*, OUP.
- Flynn, N. (2007) *Public Sector Management*, London: Sage.
- Garbutt, P. (1985) *London Transport and the Politicians*, London: Ian Allan.
- Jackson, A & Croome, D. (1962) *Rails Through Clay* Routledge.
- Johnson, G & Scholes, K. (2001) *Exploring Public Sector Strategy*, Edinburgh: Pearson.
- Johnson, G, Scholes, K & Wittington, R. (2009) *Fundamentals of Strategy*, Prentice Hall.
- Magretta, J. (2012) *Understanding Michael Porter*, Boston: Harvard.
- Mees, P. (2010), *Transport for Suburbia: Beyond the Automobile Age*, London: Earthscan.
- Nonaka, I & Takeuchi, H. (1995) *The Knowledge Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation*, OUP.
- Porter, M. (1980) *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and Competitors*, New York: Free Press.
- Porter, M. (1990) *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Shaw, G. (1908) *The Commonsense of Municipal Trading*, London: Fifield.
- The Greater London Council (1985) *London Industrial Strategy*, Heffers Printers.
- Wolmar, C. (2002) *Down the Tube*, London: Arum Press.
- Wolmar, C. (2005) *The Subterranean Railway*, London: Atlantic Books.

## Articles

- Ashfield (1933) "London Passenger Transport" *Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Great Britain*, Vol. 27 Part 5.
- Basset, K & Hoare, A. (1984) "Bristol and the saga of Royal Portbury: A case study in local politics and municipal enterprise" *Political Geography Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp223-250.
- Boone, C. (1995) "Streetcars and Politics in Rio de Janeiro: Private Enterprise versus Municipal Government in the Provision of Mass Transit, 1903—1920" *The Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol 27 Issue 2, pp343-365.
- Decker, S., Üsdiken, B., Engwall, L., & Rowlinson, M. (2018) "Special issue introduction: Historical research on institutional change", *Business History*, Vol. 60 No. 5, pp613-627
- Foster, C & Whitehead, C. (1973) "The Layfield Report on the Greater London Development Plan" *Economica*, Vol. 40 Issue 160, pp442-454.
- Glaister, S & Lewis, D (1978) "An Integrated Fares Policy for Transport in London" *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 9 pp341-355.
- Haefeli, U., Kobi, F. and Seewer, U. (2014), "History and transport policy: the Swiss experience", *Transfers*, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 45-62.
- Kuoppakangas, P. "Adopting a Municipal Enterprise Form: Expectations and Outcomes – Three Cases and Dilemmas" (2013) *Journal of Change Management* Vol. 14 Issue 1, pp126-45.
- Kraijenbrink, J., Spender, J. & Groen, A. (2010) "The Resource Based View: A review and Assessment of its Critiques", *The Journal of Management*, Vol. 36 Issue 1, pp.349-372.
- Mintzberg, H. (1990) The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management, *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 11 Issue 3, pp171-195.

- Morser, E. (2009) "Hinterland Dreams and Midwestern Rails: Public Power and Railroading in Nineteenth-Century La Crosse, Wisconsin" *Enterprise & Society*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 376-410.
- Rustin, M. (1986) "Lessons of the London Industrial Strategy" *New Left Review*, Vol. 155, pp75-84.
- Stumm, T. (1996) "Municipal Enterprise Activities as Revenue Generators: A Different View" *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp.477-488.
- Tennent, K (2017) "Profit or utility maximizing? Strategy, tactics and the Municipal Tramways of York, c. 1918-1935", *Journal of Management History*, Vol. 23 Issue: 4, pp.401-422.

### **The Transport for London Archive**

LT146/30 – LT146/54 Annual Report Series 1963-87.

LT128/118 – London Transport and Greater London Council Minutes and Meetings 1983-84.